BOARD ATTRIBUTES AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF LISTED NONFINANCIAL SERVICES FIRMS IN NIGERIA
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Abstract
Board characteristics are the control mechanisms of corporate governance vital in effective
monitoring of management, decision-making, accountability, and performance
achievement of an organization. Though regulatory mechanism factors are considered in
the design of a firm’s board, the relevance of some attributes towards firm performance is
not properly documented, especially in the Nigerian context. Therefore, this study
investigates the relationship between board size, independence, and the performance of
listed non-financial services organizations was empirically explored. The design of this
study was retrospective and secondary panel data were collected from reports and
unpublished records of thirty (30) sample non-financial service firms selected from the
Nigerian Exchange Group (NGX) in the 2014–2025 period. ROA and ROE were used as
performance proxies. Number of directors and percentage directors were used to
operationally define board independence whereas total number of members comprised the
alternative indicator. Several panel regression models, namely PLS, FE and RE regressions
were generated and the FE approach was found to be appropriate based on the Hausman
test result. The result of the analysis shows that ROA (β = 0.0031 p = 0.069) was predicted
by the board size with no statistically significant variation. In other words, the number of
directors had little influence on organizational performance in the study period. However,
the percentage of independent directors was positively and significantly associated with
ROA (β = 0.0285 p = 0.019). Similar pattern was observed for ROE implying that board
independence is a critical predictor of financial performance. Generally, the study unveiled
that corporate governance performance was primarily determined by the level of board
independence rather than size. These findings imply that organizations need to strive to
increase the extent of board independence and consider alternative indicators in enhancing
monitoring and accountability mechanisms and effective decision-making processes.